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ABSTRACT 
Interest is booming in the so-called Internet of Things (IoT). 
The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is one application of this 
trend and involves the use of smart technologies in a manufac-
turing context. Even though these applications hold the promise 
to revolutionize manufacturing, there are a number of outstand-
ing cybersecurity and data privacy issues impacting the realiza-
tion of the myriad benefits promised by IIoT proponents. This ar-
ticle analyzes some of these pressing issues, focusing on: (1) 
critical infrastructure protection and cybersecurity due diligence, 
(2) trends in transatlantic data privacy protections, and (3) the 
regulation of new technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and 
blockchain. The aticle concludes with a list of recommendations 
for state and federal policymakers to consider in an effort to 
harden the IIoT along with the supply chains critical to the con-
tinued development of smart factories. 
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Ubiquitous computing names the third wave in computing, just 
now beginning. First were mainframes, each shared by lots of 
people. Now we are in the personal computing era, person and 
machine staring uneasily at each other across the desktop. Next 
comes ubiquitous computing, or the age of calm technology, when 
technology recedes into the background of our lives. 
- Mark Weiser,1 1996 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, for only the second time in history at that point, a 
cyberattack was confirmed to have caused physical damage.2 
The first such episode was Stuxnet.3 This time, the target was 
not Iran’s nuclear program, but a steel mill in Germany. 
Specifically, a blast furnace was compromised causing 
“‘massive’—though unspecified—damage.”4 Attackers had 
gained access to the plant through the firm’s business network, 
highlighting the insecurity that can stem from interconnected 
systems even when a firewall is in place.5 There have been 
unconfirmed reports of similar incidents, such as one involving 
a petrochemical factory that was compromised by a coffee 
maker.6 This issue is coming to the fore with the expansion of 
Internet-connected devices in the manufacturing sector. These 
                                                          
 1. Personal website of Mark Weiser, UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING (Mar. 17, 
1996, 8:00 PM), http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser/UbiHome.html 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170214230140/http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext 
/weiser/UbiHome.html]. 
 2. See Kim Zetter, A Cyberattack Has Caused Confirmed Physical Damage 
for the Second Time Ever, WIRED (Jan. 8, 2015, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/01/german-steel-mill-hack-destruction/ 
[https://perma.cc/4M49-2HTY] (describing a cyber attack on an unnamed 
German steel mill). 
 3. See Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First 
Digital Weapon, WIRED (Nov. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014
/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/ [https://perma.cc/P5L3-LXCY] (describing 
the Stuxnet cyber attack on Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges). 
 4. See Zetter, supra note 2. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See C10H15N1, How the Coffee-Machine Took down a Factories Control 
Room, REDDIT (July 22, 2017, 11:39:47 AM), https://www.reddit.com
/r/talesfromtechsupport/comments/6ovy0h/how_the_coffeemachine_took_down
_a_factories/ [https://perma.cc/86MP-NKRV] (describing a ransomware attack 
on wifi-enabled coffee machines, which spread to the factory control systems). 
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devices promise new efficiencies and innovations while also 
introducing new vulnerabilities.7 
The Internet of Things (IoT) underscores the notion of a 
hyper-connected future.8 As one example, McKinsey Consulting 
has estimated the economic impact of the Internet of Things, or 
what may be more accurately described as the “Network of 
Things,”9 at $6.2 trillion by 2025.10 The Industrial Internet of 
Things (IIoT), sometimes also called the “Factory of Things,” or 
“Smart Factory Wave,” involves the use of IoT technologies in 
manufacturing applications.11 It holds the promise to 
revolutionize manufacturing, including in the fields of “factory 
health, digital thread, and smart products.”12 Already, a number 
of industrial control systems (ICS) manufacturers, such as 
Rockwell Automation, are offering a range of IIoT products from 
programmable controllers and industrial sensors to distributed 
                                                          
 7. These include distributed denial of service attacks and botnets such as 
Mirai. See generally, Constantinos Kolias et al., DDoS in the IoT: Mirai and 
Other Botnets, 50 IEEE COMPUTER 80 (2017) (warning that the ubiquity of 
internet-connected devices provides a large and vulnerable platform that can be 
exploited by botnets to amplify cyberattacks). 
 8. See generally Scott J. Shackelford et al., When Toasters Attack: A 
Polycentric Approach to Enhancing the “Security of Things,” 2017 U. ILL L. REV. 
415 (2017) (explaining the Internet of Things and associated challenges); see 
also Scott J. Shackelford & Scott Bradner, Have You Updated Your Toaster? 
Transatlantic Approaches to Governing the Internet of Everything, (Kelley Sch. 
of Bus., Res. Paper No. 18-60), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=3208018. 
 9. See generally Bernardo A. Huberman, Ensuring Trust and Security in 
the Industrial IoT, UBIQUITY, (Jan. 2016) 
https://ubiquity.acm.org/article.cfm?id=2822883 (describing the Internet of 
Things as a “network of small sensors that enables precise control and 
monitoring of complex processes over arbitrary distances.”). 
 10. Chunka Mui, Thinking Big About the Industrial Internet of Things, 
FORBES (Mar. 4, 2016, 10:03 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chunkamui
/2016/03/04/thinking-big-about-industrial-iot/#7f1e54066220 
[https://perma.cc/CHX5-QFFX]. 
 11. See Richard D. Taylor, The Next Stage of U.S. Communications Policy: 
The Emerging Embedded Infosphere, 41 TELECOMM. POL’Y 1039, 1039 (2017) 
(“The United States needs to reimagine the basic principles of its 
telecommunications and information policy to fit an emerging society in which 
networking and intelligence are embedded into an increasing number of 
everyday things which constantly monitor and measure our lives. This 
emerging environment is an always-on, ubiquitous, integrated system 
comprised of the Internet of Things, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence/Intelligent 
Systems and the Intercloud, which act together as a single system, referred to 
here as the ‘Embedded Infosphere’ (EI).”). 
 12. See Mui, supra note 10. 
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control systems.13 However, while such products promote 
efficiency, they also increase the attack surface and with it the 
cyber risk that manufacturers must manage.14 
Numerous outstanding cybersecurity and data privacy 
issues impact the realization of the myriad benefits promised by 
IIoT, including the use of personal data in factory settings.15 Yet, 
to date, there has been a paucity of literature on the topic.16 This 
                                                          
 13. See Product Offerings, Rockwell Automation, https://www 
.rockwellautomation.com/en_NA/products/overview.page (last visited Dec. 20, 
2019). 
 14. See Bob Tarzey, The Ever-Growing IoT Attack Surface, COMPUTER 
WEEKLY: QUOCIRCA INSIGHTS (July 6, 2017, 8:56 AM), https://www.
computerweekly.com/blog/Quocirca-Insights/The-ever-growing-IoT-attack 
-surface [https://perma.cc/928Z-GP9S] (discussing IoT vulnerabilities). 
 15. See, e.g., Randy Vogenberg et al., Personalized Medicine, 35 PHARMACY 
& THERAPEUTICS 624 (2010) (describing the application of this concept in the 
personalized medicine movement and discussing the fact that high-risk 
personal data is typically not covered under HIPAA). 
 16. Cf. Charles J. Barnes, Smart Home Alone: The World’s Gateway to More 
Efficient Use of Energy and Mayhem, 5 LSU J. OF ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 365, 
368 (2017) (“Industry leaders and Smart Grid regulators are pushing for greater 
interoperability within the Smart Grid. Although greater interoperability 
would be beneficial, if unchecked, this policy will lead to a kinetic cyber attack.”) 
(footnote omitted); Nikole Davenport, Smart Washers May Clean Your Clothes, 
but Hacks Can Clean out Your Privacy, and Underdeveloped Regulations Could 
Leave You Hanging on a Line, 32 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 259, 
262–63 (2016) (“The IoT is a broad concept used colloquially to encompass many 
or all of the interconnected devices in our future. But industry experts identify 
three subsets to the general IoT category which are the Industrial Internet (i.e. 
all interconnected products, sensors, controls, etc., used in industry and 
business), the Internet-of-everything (consumer objects and systems that 
combine people and data), and the Cyber physical systems (which are the 
systems that connect it all).”); Kevin DiGrazia, Cyber Insurance, Data Security, 
and Blockchain in the Wake of the Equifax Breach, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 255, 
262 (2018) (“Firms purchasing cyber insurance should understand what their 
current insurance policies will cover, and what duplicate coverage and peril 
gaps exist. With the surge in automation of the IoT and the Industrial Internet 
of Things (“[IIoT]”), hackers will increasingly be able to cause physical damage 
to machinery and other equipment.”); Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age 
of the Internet of Things: Article 2 of the UCC and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
839, 906 n.367 (2016) (noting that cyber attacks on the Industrial Internet of 
Things are increasing); Andrew G. Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the 
Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 813 (2016) (“Experts 
predict that the worldwide scale of such ‘smart,’ interconnected objects will 
continue to grow, reaching more than fifty billion objects in 2020, and one 
trillion by 2025. As inexpensive, unobtrusive identifying technology combines 
with more sophisticated wireless networks, new possibilities will emerge to 
allow tracking of human and nonhuman activity. The result will be additional 
options for government surveillance that can reveal the patterns of everyday 
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article analyzes some of these gaps, focusing on: (1) critical 
infrastructure protection and cybersecurity due diligence, (2) 
trends in transatlantic data privacy protections relevant to 
manufacturers, and (3) the regulation of new technologies like 
AI and blockchain and their applicability to address IIoT 
security and privacy challenges. This article concludes with an 
analysis of options available to state and federal policymakers to 
help harden IIoT devices and supply chains against cyber 
attacks. 
I. CYBERSECURITY AND DATA PRIVACY IIOT HOT 
TOPICS 
Although there are differing accounts as to the origin story 
of the term “Internet of Things,” most accounts point to Kevin 
Ashton coining it in the form of a title for a 1999 presentation for 
Proctor & Gamble.17 But the idea has been around for longer, 
including as pervasive computing, “Ubiquitous Computing,” and 
“Real-World Web.”18 Although these terms are not all 
analogous,19 it is true that from these humble beginnings has 
come a global effort to make our technology, businesses, and 
                                                          
life.”) (footnotes omitted); Dera J. Nevin & Marc Jenkins, Information, 
Knowledge, and the Pursuit of Privacy, 38 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 485, 488–89 
(2015) (arguing that “‘Big Iron’ companies like General Electric (GE) have 
become Big Data technology companies.”); Dalmacio V. Posadas, Jr., After the 
Gold Rush: The Boom of the Internet of Things, and the Busts of Data-Security 
and Privacy, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 69, 76 (2017) (“On 
a larger scale, the so-called Industrial IoT is streamlining industrial production 
across the world. However, what remains unclear is the depth and breadth of 
how these efficient objects will impact privacy.”) (footnote omitted). 
 17. See Kevin Ashton, That ‘Internet of Things’ Thing, RFID J. (June 22, 
2009), www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?4986 [https://perma.cc/J638-8KN3] 
(describing one possible origin of the term). 
 18. See Jackie Fenn & Hung LeHong, Hype Cycle for Emerging 
Technologies, GARTNER (July 28, 2011), https://www.gartner.com/doc/1754719 
/hype-cycle-emerging-technologies (explaining the Gartner “hype cycle.” The 
“hype cycle” is a graphical model used by the I.T. firm Gartner to represent 
periods of excitement and disillusionment); see Detlef Zuehlke, Smart-Factory: 
Towards a Factory-of-Things, 34 ANN. REV. CONTROL 129, 129 (2010) (applying 
the concept of “ubiquitous computing”). See also Jennifer S. Winter, Privacy, 
Algorithmic Discrimination, and the Internet of Things, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
INFORMATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 4951, 4951–52 (Medhi Khosrow-
Pour ed., 2018) (applying the concepts of “ubiquitous computing” and “ambient 
intelligence”). 
 19. See Winter, supra note 18 (discussing the difference between 
“ubiquitous computing” and “ambient intelligence.”). 
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even our bodies, smart.20 Wherever it came from, the term IoT 
today now enjoys widespread use in both technology and policy 
circles, as well as in popular culture.21 It includes a constellation 
of devices and technologies with built-in wireless connectivity 
that “can be monitored, controlled[,] and linked”22 together, as is 
represented in Figure 1. 
Fig. 1 2016 Gartner IoT ‘Hype Cycle’23 
The increasingly hyper-connected network of products and 
systems comprising IoT opens up new economic opportunities, 
                                                          
 20. See, e.g., Meghan Neal, The Internet of Bodies is Coming, and You 
Could Get Hacked, MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 13, 2014, 1:20 PM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/gvyqgm/the-internet-of-bodies-is-
coming-and-you-could-get-hacked [https://perma.cc/4YN5-GZEJ] (discussing 
the effort to augment bodies using implantable technology). 
 21. See Fenn & LeHong, supra note 18 (discussing contemporary use of the 
term “Internet of Things”). 
 22. Bonnie Cha, A Beginner’s Guide to Understanding the Internet of 
Things, RECODE (Jan. 15, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.recode.net
/2015/1/15/11557782/a-beginners-guide-to-understanding-the-internet-of 
-things [https://perma.cc/6GE2-MC7G]. 
 23. Technologies Underpin the Hype Cycle for the Internet of Things, 2016, 
GARTNER (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner 
/7-technologies-underpin-the-hype-cycle-for-the-internet-of-things-2016/ 
(describing the Gartner “hype cycle” for IoT technology).  
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along with vulnerabilities.24 Already, though, some of the 
excitement may be fading in the wake of well-publicized 
vulnerabilities, such as may be seen with smart lightbulbs 
already being in the “Trough of Disillusionment” in Figure 1. 
This section explores some of the security implications in the 
smart factory revolution, what has been called the “fourth 
revolution” in this space,25 before moving on to analyzing the 
associated policy implications. 
A. SMART FACTORIES AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROTECTION 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is tasked with 
defining and defending these vital industries, which it 
subdivides into sixteen sectors.26 These sectors are not fixed; for 
example, elections were included under the public facilities 
                                                          
 24. See Aaron Tilley, How Hackers Could Use A Nest Thermostat As An 
Entry Point Into Your Home, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/aarontilley/2015/03/06/nest-thermostat-hack-home 
-network/#235d0d693986 [https://perma.cc/9VYV-ECT4]; Carl Franzen, How to 
Find a Hack-Proof Baby Monitor, OFFSPRING (Aug. 4, 2017, 6:30 PM), 
https://offspring.lifehacker.com/how-to-find-a-hack-proof-baby-monitor-
1797534985 [https://perma.cc/T9ZQ-QE2X]; Charlie Osborne, Smartwatch 
Security Fails to Impress: Top Devices Vulnerable to Cyberattack, ZDNET (July 
22, 2015), http://www.zdnet.com/article/smartwatch-security 
-fails-to-impress-top-devices-vulnerable-to-cyberattack/; John Markoff, Why 
Light Bulbs May Be the Next Hacker Target, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/technology/why-light-bulbs-may-be-the 
-next-hacker-target.html (providing examples of the threat hackers pose to 
smarter tech). 
 25. Hyoung Seok Kang et al., Smart Manufacturing: Past Research, Present 
Findings, and Future Directions, 3 INT’L J. PRECISION ENG’G & MFG.-GREEN 
TECH. 111, 118 (2016). 
 26. See Directive on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 2013 
DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 92 (Fed. 12, 2013); Supporting policy and Doctrine, 
DHS, (last visited Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/supporting-policy-
and-doctrine [https://perma.cc/R22C-A3WN]; Frequently Asked Questions, (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2019) http://web.archive.org/web/20140117082728/http://ics-
cert.us-cert.gov/Frequently-Asked-Questions (describing the U.S. Cyber 
Emergency Response Team, which is part of DHS, and identifying sixteen 
critical infrastructure sectors consistent with Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 7 including: agriculture, banking and finance, chemical, commercial 
facilities, dams, defense industrial base, drinking water and water treatment 
systems, emergency systems, energy, government facilities, information 
technology, nuclear systems, public health and healthcare, telecommunications, 
and transportation systems). 
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sector in January 2017.27 Smart factories fall under an array of 
critical infrastructure sectors, including the critical 
manufacturing sector itself (which comprises electrical 
equipment and appliances along with transportation) along with 
the communications, healthcare, and even the defense industrial 
base. As such, firms operating in this space should be aware of 
the possibility for substantial federal oversight, such as would 
have been required under the Cybersecurity Act of 2012.28 Each 
of these sixteen sectors boasts an Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center (ISAC) to help spread cyber threat information, 
along with awareness as to best practices.29 Efforts have also 
been made to break down silos between sectors, such as through 
Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs).30 
Such public-private bi-directional information sharing between 
the critical infrastructure sectors will be essential to defending 
the IIoT, including both information technology (IT) (e.g., 
business systems) and operations technology (OT) that cover 
those systems in the manufacturing environment.31 The latter 
distinction is important since IT efforts typically prioritize their 
focus on confidentiality, integrity and then availability, while 
OT efforts place the highest priority on availability. 
                                                          
 27. See Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election 
Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. 
(Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/statement-secretary 
-johnson-designation-election-infrastructure-critical (designating “election 
infrastructure” as a critical infrastructure subsector). 
 28. See Scott J. Shackelford, In Search of Cyber Peace: A Response to the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 106 (Mar. 8, 2012), 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/cyber-peace (responding to the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012). 
 29. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CHEMICAL-SECTOR SPECIFIC PLAN 
(2015) (“The sector is currently pilot testing an Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center (ISAC) to facilitate the dissemination of cyber threat data 
between DHS, other government agencies, and the Chemical Sector.”). 
 30. See generally Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations 
(ISAOs), U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/information 
-sharing-and-analysis-organizations-isaos [https://perma.cc/2YGZ-Z9HZ] (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2019) (providing a general overview of Information Sharing 
and Analysis Organizations). 
 31. See Amanda Ziadeh, Homeland Security is Building Collective Defense 
Against Adversaries, GOVT. CIO MEDIA (July 20, 2018, 3:57 PM), 
https://www.governmentciomedia.com/homeland-security-building-collective 
-defense-against-adversaries  [https://perma.cc/ZNN5-FBTH] (advocating a 
joint effort between the government and the private sector to better combat 
cyber threats). 
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Compounding the challenge is that most existing OT systems do 
not have the capacity to add cybersecurity protections without 
negatively impacting production. This fact will be all the more 
important as threats to smart factories proliferate. 
1. Threats from Foreign Nation-States and Economic 
Espionage Campaigns 
In March 2018, the FBI and DHS jointly accused the 
Russian government of a “multi-stage intrusion campaign” 
targeting the U.S. power grid along with compromising the 
industrial control systems of several “small commercial 
facilities.”32 This episode is just one data point in a long history 
of cyber attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure with links to 
Russia.33 The United States is far from alone. For example, 
Ukraine experienced waves of attacks including “the first-ever 
confirmed cyberattack against grid infrastructure.”34 Russia is 
not alone in its online aggression either, with the list of cyber 
powers growing to more than fifty nations, not to mention 
sophisticated criminal organizations, firms, and hacktivists.35 
Iran, for example, has reportedly readied a wave of cyber attacks 
                                                          
 32. Taylor Hatmaker, DHS and FBI Detail How Russia Is Hacking into 
U.S. Nuclear Facilities and Other Critical Infrastructure, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 
15, 2018, 3:54 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/15/russia-energy-hack-dhs 
-fbi-us-cert/ [https://perma.cc/C9DC-HT74]. 
 33. See OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, JOINT DHS, ODNI, 
FBI STATEMENT ON RUSSIAN MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY (Dec. 29, 2016) 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/joint-dhs-odni-fbi-statement 
-on-russian-malicious-cyber-activity (detailing Russian efforts to cyber attack 
the U.S. government and its citizens). 
 34. Jeff St. John, The Real Cybersecurity Issues Behind the Overhyped 
‘Russia Hacks the Grid’ Story, GREENTECH (Jan. 4, 2017), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-real-cybersecurity-issues 
-behind-the-overhyped-russia-hacks-the-grid-st [https://perma.cc/6GGN-
GFVQ]. 
 35. E.g., Keth Breene, Who Are the Cyberwar Superpowers?, WORLD ECON. 
F. (May 4, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/who-are-the-
cyberwar-superpowers/ [https://perma.cc/2NJY-38UG] (one list of potential 
nations designated as “cyber superpowers”); Elvis Plesky, Top Hacking Groups 
Impacting Cybersecurity Today, PLESK (July 3, 2018), 
https://www.plesk.com/blog/business-industry/top-hacking-groups-
cybersecurity-today/ (listing various hacking groups and their histories); 
Shannon Vavra, The World’s Top Cyber Powers, AXIOS (Aug. 13, 2017), 
https://www.axios.com/the-worlds-top-cyber-powers-1513304669-4fa53675-
b7e6-4276-a2bf-4a84b4986fe9.html [https://perma.cc/DC7W-ZVKX] (listing the 
world’s top cyberpowers and the types of attacks they are capable of launching). 
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against critical infrastructure in response to the United States’ 
withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement.36 
Yet the threat of cyber conflict is also only one facet in the 
multi-faceted cyber risk facing smart factories. Another facet is 
the continued prevalence of trade secrets theft, even after the 
U.S.-China 2015 Cybersecurity Code of Conduct, which was 
designed to safeguard commercial intellectual property and was 
prompted in part by hackers targeting U.S. Steel.37 The rise of 
IIoT generally, and smart factories in particular, has expanded 
the threat surface against which manufacturers will have to 
protect their systems and property, necessitating advances in 
cybersecurity due diligence. In one demonstration, for example, 
a single compromised wireless webcam was able to “jam all 
wireless communication and thereby stop production” at a 
factory.38 Other threats are numerous and can emanate from an 
array of actors such as criminal organizations, terrorist groups, 
insider threats, and intellectual property thieves.39 
2. Meaning of “Cybersecurity Due Diligence” for Smart 
Factories 
“Due diligence” has a multitude of meanings depending on 
the context, nation, and sector involved.40 In the transactional 
                                                          
 36. See Courtney Kube et al., Iran has Laid Groundwork for Extensive 
Cyberattacks on U.S., Say Officials, NBC NEWS (July 20, 2018, 10:50 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/iran-has-laid-groundwork-extensive 
-cyberattacks-u-s-say-officials-n893081 [https://perma.cc/W8VR-W49Q] 
(“Iranian hackers have laid the groundwork to carry out extensive cyberattacks 
on U.S. and European infrastructure and on private companies . . . .”). 
 37. See Gary Brown & Christopher D. Yung, Evaluating the US-China 
Cybersecurity Agreement, Part I: The US Approach to Cyberspace, DIPLOMAT 
(Jan. 19, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/evaluating-the-us 
-china-cybersecurity-agreement-part-1-the-us-approach-to-cyberspace/; Colin 
Hanna, China Stonewalls U. S. Steel’s Cybertheft Lawsuit, INVESTOR’S 
BUSINESS DAILY (Mar. 27, 2017), https:// 
www.investors.com/politics/commentary/china-stonewalls-u-s-steels-cyber 
-theft-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/2EFJ-3WRR]. 
 38. Zuehlke, supra note 18, at 136. 
 39. See generally Scott J. Shackelford et al., Using BITs to Protect Bytes: 
Promoting Cyber Peace by Safeguarding Trade Secrets Through Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 12–13 (2015) (detailing potential cyber 
threats to trade secrets). 
 40. See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford et al., Unpacking the International Law 
on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Public and Private Sectors. 17 
Chi. J. Int’l L. 1, 7–20 (2016) (discussing different standards of cybersecurity 
due diligence in caselaw). 
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context, cybersecurity due diligence has been defined as “the 
review of the governance, processes, and controls that are used 
to secure information assets.”41 This broad understanding builds 
from the corporate, national, and international obligations of 
both state and non-state actors to help identify and instill 
cybersecurity best practices across a range of actors.42 Such a 
broad, multidisciplinary understanding of this concept is vital in 
the IoT context in particular, given the extent to which networks 
and systems interact. Here, cybersecurity due diligence is 
centered on identifying and spreading risk management best 
practices between State and non-State actors, so as to promote 
security in smart manufacturing. One illustration is the 
Governance, Risk, and Compliance (GRC) Framework, which 
considers the “capabilities that integrate the governance, 
management and assurance of performance, risk, and 
compliance activities” across an organization.43 The question 
becomes how manufacturers can fulfill GRC responsibilities, 
which include not just protecting technical infrastructure, but 
also safeguarding trade secrets and sensitive personal data that 
may be subject to big data analytics and deep learning. The next 
section discusses this topic.44 
                                                          
 41. Tim Ryan & Leonard Navarro, Cyber Due Diligence: Pre-Transaction 
Assessments Can Uncover Costly Risks, KROLL (Jan. 28, 2015), 
https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/cyber-due-diligence-pre 
-transaction-assessments [https://perma.cc/AW3X-Z43H]. 
 42. See generally Scott J. Shackelford, The Meaning of Cyber Peace, NOTRE 
DAME INST. ADV. STUDY Q. (2013), https://ndias.nd.edu/news-publications
/ndias-quarterly/the-meaning-of-cyber-peace/ (discussing the concept of “cyber 
peace” and the role that state and non-state actors play in maintaining cyber 
peace). 
 43. What is GRC?, OCEG, https://www.oceg.org/about/what-is-grc/ 
[https://perma.cc/X47X-289D] (last visited Nov. 27, 2019). 
 44. In general, data privacy policies are needed to cover proprietary 
manufacturing data generated by the IIoT. Such data may range from the code 
that runs machines to the output of sensors that measure recipe amounts and 
composition. There are a number of situations where such data may be captured 
and aggregated by supply chain partners, equipment manufacturers, and 
others. The lack of a clear delineation of ownership is an impediment for 
companies to connect their IIoT systems to each other, reducing the benefits of 
digital manufacturing. 
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3. Federal Cybersecurity Frameworks and Standards 
Impacting Smart Factories 
Two of the main efforts aimed at defining cybersecurity due 
diligence that are most relevant to the smart factory context are 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
Cybersecurity Framework (NIST CSF) and the Federal Trade 
Commission’s (FTC) guidance.45 The NIST CSF was born from 
President Obama’s efforts to empower NIST to partner with 
industry and develop a framework comprised of private-sector 
cybersecurity best practices that would help inform an array of 
organizations in their cybersecurity decision-making processes, 
but particularly those operating critical infrastructure.46 The 
result was the first NIST CSF, in 2014. While critics have 
complained about the framework’s reactive stance,47 it 
nevertheless is helping to define cybersecurity due diligence in 
the United States.48 The NIST CSF takes manufacturing 
concerns into account; indeed, NIST deserves credit for focusing 
its efforts on improving cybersecurity due diligence in factories, 
as seen in its published Cybersecurity Framework 
Manufacturing Profile that is “a roadmap for reducing 
                                                          
 45. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., IMPROVING CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY EXEC. ORDER 13636: PRELIMINARY 
CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK 1 (2013). 
 46. See NIST Marks Fifth Anniversary of Popular Cybersecurity 
Framework, NIST (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news 
/2019/02/nist-marks-fifth-anniversary-popular-cybersecurity-framework 
[https://perma.cc/PQ5R-2HLH]. 
 47. See, e.g., Taylor Armerding, NIST’s Finalized Cybersecurity Framework 
Receives Mixed Reviews, CSO (Jan. 31, 2014), 
http://www.csoonline.com/article/2134338/security-leadership/nist-s-finalized 
-cybersecurity-framework-receives-mixed-reviews.html 
[https://perma.cc/W9C4-7WL2] (describing a critique of the NIST CSF as being 
backward-looking, rather than forward-looking). 
 48. See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Standard of 
Cybersecurity Care?: Exploring the Implications of the 2014 Cybersecurity 
Framework on Shaping Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity 
Practices, 50 TEX. J. INT’L L. 287 (2015) (analyzing the impact of the 
Cybersecurity Framework on domestic industry and the international 
landscape); Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell, & Andreas Kuehn, Unpacking 
the International Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Public 
and Private Sectors, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2016) (arguing for a “proactive 
regime” in the public and private sector that draws off the NIST framework). 
14 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 21:1 
 
cybersecurity risk for manufacturers.”49 Rather than replace 
security policies already in effect, NIST intends these 
“voluntary, risk-based” efforts to enhance existing commitments 
and support organizations in their efforts to “identify, 
implement, and improve cybersecurity practices, and create[] a 
common language for internal and external communication of 
cybersecurity issues.”50 The original NIST CSF was voluntary,51 
but advocates have increasingly made the case that if an 
organization’s “cybersecurity practices were ever questioned 
during litigation or a regulatory investigation, the ‘standard’ for 
‘due diligence’ was now the NIST [CSF].”52 While it was 
originally published in 2014, NIST has remained engaged in this 
space,53 as seen in the development of the 2018 NIST Privacy 
Framework,54 and the 2016 NIST CSF for small businesses,55 all 
of which are important data points for boosting cybersecurity 
and privacy due diligence in the smart manufacturing context. 
The NIST CSF not only has the potential to gradually shape 
a standard of care for domestic manufacturing, but also could 
help to harmonize global cybersecurity best practices for given 
active NIST collaborations with more than twenty nations 
                                                          
 49. KEITH A. STOUFFER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., 
CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK MANUFACTURING PROFILE, NISTIR 8183 (2017), 
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8183. 
 50. Why You Should Adopt the NIST Framework 1, PWC (May 2014), 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/increasing-it-effectiveness/publications/assets 
/adopt-the-nist.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RFW-4MEM]. 
 51. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY (2015), available at https://
www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-
framework-021214.pdf. 
 52. John Verry, Why the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Isn’t Really 
Voluntary, PIVOT POINT SECURITY: BLOG (Feb. 25, 2014), 
https://www.pivotpointsecurity.com/blog/nist-cybersecurity-framework 
[https://perma.cc/DW4R-EKBT] (discussing guidance given to Municipal Utility 
Districts). 
 53. See, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH, NIST RELEASES VERSION 
1.1 OF ITS POPULAR CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK (Apr. 16, 2018), https:// 
www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2018/04/nist-releases-version-11-its-popular 
-cybersecurity-framework [https://perma.cc/77XX-FGG9] (announcing the 
release of updated standards based on user feedback). 
 54. Developing a Privacy Framework, 83 Fed. Reg. 56824 (Nov. 14, 2018) 
(requesting comment on proposed updates to the privacy framework). 
 55. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., SMALL BUSINESS INFORMATION 
SECURITY: THE FUNDAMENTALS (2016), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir
/2016/NIST.IR.7621r1.pdf. 
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including the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, Israel, and 
Germany.56 Such a global push is particularly important in the 
manufacturing sector given the extent to which supply chains 
straddle jurisdictions, and even continents.57 Progress toward 
further defining baseline cybersecurity due diligence in the 
manufacturing context has continued with the publication of 
Version 1.1 of the NIST CSF in April 2018, which, as Secretary 
of Commerce Wilbur Ross has argued “should be every 
company’s first line of defense.”58 The new version boasts 
significant improvements, including modernized policies 
regarding authentication, supply chain cybersecurity, and 
vulnerability disclosure.59 Yet, the NIST CSF is still best 
considered a cybersecurity floor rather than a ceiling. It does not, 
for example, focus on IoT issues in particular, which is an area 
that many would like NIST to address in more detail as is 
discussed further below. 
Similar to NIST, commentators have made the case that the 
FTC suggests “tackling data security and all consumer-facing 
software development efforts with a holistic approach that 
incorporates a ‘privacy by design’ strategy to address the entire 
life cycle of data collection, use, access, storage and ultimately 
secure data deletion.”60 In particular, the FTC suggests keeping 
software updated, encrypting sensitive data, using multi-factor 
authentication, and having an updated incident response plan.61 
                                                          
 56. The FTC’s enforcement powers may already be facilitating the 
development of these best practices. See, e.g., Brian Fung, A Court Just Made 
It Easier for the Government to Sue Companies for Getting Hacked, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2015/08/24/a-court-just-made-it-easier-for-the-government-to-sue 
-companies-for-getting-hacked/. 
 57. See, e.g., Maria Korolov, What Is a Supply Chain Attack? Why You 
Should Be Wary of Third-Party Providers, CSO (Apr. 4, 2018, 8:15 AM), 
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3191947/data-breach/what-is-a-supply 
-chain-attack-why-you-should-be-wary-of-third-party-providers.html 
[https://perma.cc/DP24-QV5Q]; Warwick Ashford, Most Businesses Vulnerable 
to Supply Chain Cyber Attacks, COMPUT. WEEKLY (Apr. 30, 2019, 11:30 AM), 
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252462476/Most-businesses 
-vulnerable-to-supply-chain-cyber-attacks [https://perma.cc/MH2P-FSPA]. 
 58. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 53. 
 59. Id. 
 60. FTC Enters “Internet of Things” Arena with TRENDnet Proposed 
Settlement, INFO. L. GP. (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.infolawgroup.com/blog 
/2013/09/articles/ftc/trendnet-settlement/. 
 61. See Cybersecurity Basics, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips 
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The FTC is able to give such suggestions binding legal force 
thanks to Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
which established the FTC and empowers it to police “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.”62 The FTC has wielded this 
authority to penalize firms for lax privacy and cybersecurity 
standards.63 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit upheld the FTC’s power in this regard in 2015 in FTC v. 
Wyndham Worldwide.64 However, a 2018 case, LabMD Inc. v. 
Federal Trade Commission, underscored a potential growing 
circuit split involving the FTC, which may require it to be more 
specific in the cybersecurity requirements it places on 
businesses.65 This could include requiring more firms to take 
measures that so far the FTC has only encouraged on a 
voluntary basis, including: 
* [B]uild security into devices at the outset, rather than as an after-
thought in the design process; 
* [T]rain employees about the importance of security, and ensure 
that security is managed at an appropriate level in the organization; 
* [E]nsure that when outside service providers are hired, that those 
providers are capable of maintaining reasonable security, and provide 
reasonable oversight of the providers; 
* [W]hen a security risk is identified, consider a “defense-in-depth” 
strategy whereby multiple layers of security may be used to defend 
against a particular risk; 
                                                          
-advice/business-center/small-businesses/cybersecurity/basics (last visited Nov. 
10, 2019) (encouraging small business owners to adopt the listed practices). 
 62. 15 U.S.C. § 45; See also A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement 
-authority (describing the ability of the FTC to investigate and enforce as 
necessary). 
 63. See Privacy & Data Security Update: 2018, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2018), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/ files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security 
-update-2018/2018-privacy-data-security-report-508.pdf (describing recent 
enforcement actions brought by the FTC). 
 64. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 248–249 (3rd Cir. 
2015). See also W. Reece Hirsch & Rahul Kapoor, Third Circuit Sides with FTC 
in Data Security with Wyndham, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 8, 2015), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/third-circuit-sides-ftc-data-security 
-dispute-wyndham.   
 65. LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221, 1237 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding an 
FTC cease and desist order unenforceable for failing to enjoin “a specific act or 
practice” and requiring the business in question improve its “data security 
program to meet an indeterminable standard of reasonableness.”). 
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* [C]onsider measures to keep unauthorized users from accessing a 
consumer’s device, data, or personal information stored on the net-
work; 
* [M]onitor connected devices throughout their expected life cycle, 
and where feasible, provide security patches to cover known risks.66 
However, due to complex supply chains and a global 
customer base, U.S. federal IoT regulations are by no means the 
only ones IIoT proponents must consider. The next section 
considers the impact of the State of California’s recent efforts 
before moving on to discuss the European Union’s regulatory 
efforts at cybersecurity and data privacy in the smart 
manufacturing sector. 
4. State-Level IIoT Policy: California Case Study 
California’s 2018 Consumer Privacy Act is helping set a new 
standard for U.S. Privacy protections, following in the footsteps 
of its groundbreaking 2002 privacy law that ushered in the first 
data breach notification standards.67 This latter idea has since 
been copied by the other 49 states68 and the European Union69 
as is discussed further in the next subsection. Although the 2018 
Privacy Act70 does not go quite as far as the European Union’s 
new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)71 discussed 
below, it does include provisions that allow consumers to sue 
over data breaches, and obtain information about how their data 
is being gathered and used by companies to make more informed 
decisions.72 Although there remains debate about the scope and 
                                                          
 66. FTC Report on Internet of Things Urges Companies to Adopt Best 
Practices to Address Consumer Privacy and Security Risks, FED. TRADE COMM’N 
(Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/01/ftc 
-report-internet-things-urges-companies-adopt-best-practices. 
 67. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.29, 1798.82 (Deering 2002). 
 68. Computer Crime Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information 
-technology/computer-hacking-and-unauthorized-access-laws.aspx#Hacking 
(last updated June 14, 2018). 
 69. See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 85, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. 
 70. California Consumer Privacy Act 2018, Cal. Civ. Code §§1798.100–.199 
(Deering 2019). 
 71. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 1, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. 
 72. See Ben Adler, California Passes Strict Internet Privacy Law with 
Implications for the Country, NPR (June 29, 2018) https://www.npr.org
/2018/06/29/624336039/california-passes-strict-internet-privacy-law-with-
implications-for-the-country [https://perma.cc/U3RG-STY9] (describing the 
privacy implications of the law). 
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effectiveness of this intervention,73 the law may well help shape 
the cybersecurity practices of the manufacturing base in 
California along with their business partners, such as by 
requiring added efforts to protect the privacy rights of 
consumers and suppliers.74 
This law builds on California’s existing IoT policies. One of 
these relevant efforts dates back to 2016, when California 
expanded its definition of the term “personal information” to 
include “a person’s name in combination with his or her Social 
Security number, driver’s license or [state] identification card, 
credit or debit card number and password, or medical 
information.”75 This definition is still narrower than that 
applicable in the EU under the GDPR—where even a person’s 
IP address is considered Personally Identifiable Information 
(PII)—but it should be considered a step in that direction.76 In 
addition, California law requires “companies that share such 
information to not only take extra security precautions 
themselves when managing the information, but to ensure that 
any entities they share information with also abide by strict 
security measures.”77 Indeed, in practical effect, this regulation 
requires covered firms to include “contractual provisions 
mandating implementation of reasonable security measures.”78 
This requirement could have an even greater impact on 
cybersecurity due diligence overall given the size of California’s 
                                                          
 73. See Jeff Kosseff, Ten Reasons Why California’s New Data Protection 
Law is Unworkable, Burdensome, and Possibly Unconstitutional (Guest Blog 
Post), TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (July 9, 2018), https://blog.ericgoldman.org
/archives/2018/07/ten-reasons-why-californias-new-data-protection-law-is-
unworkable-burdensome-and-possibly-unconstitutional-guest-blog-post.htm 
[https://perma.cc/959C-RN24] (summarizing regulatory and constitutional 
issues concerning with the new California data protection law). 
 74. See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act 2018, Cal. Civ. Code § 
1798.100(a) (Deering 2019) (“A consumer shall have the right to request that a 
business that collects a consumer’s personal information disclose to that 
consumer the categories and specific pieces of personal information the business 
has collected.”). 
 75. Dan Cook, New Privacy Regs in CA, NV Tighten Security Measures, 
BENEFITSPRO (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.benefitspro.com/2015/08/12/new 
-privacy-regs-in-ca-nv-tighten-security-measure. 
 76. See What is Personal Data?, EU GDPR COMPLIANT, 
https://eugdprcompliant.com/personal-data/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2019). 
 77. Cook, supra note 75. 
 78. Id. 
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economy—which is bigger than the UK’s as of 2018.79 
California’s regulatory regime could further promote the global 
acceptance of both the NIST CSF and the FTC cybersecurity 
efforts discussed above. 
B. TRANSATLANTIC APPROACHES TO DATA PRIVACY IN THE 
INDUSTRIAL IOT CONTEXT 
As discussed above, the cybersecurity and data privacy 
regime within the United States is sector-specific. In contrast, 
the European Union has taken a distinct and far more 
regulatory and comprehensive approach.80 Examples include the 
2018 passage of the Network Information Security (NIS) 
Directive, and the enactment of the GDPR, both of which are 
explored in this section. The EU approach is not without its 
critics, such as those who are concerned about over-
centralization,81 but it is equally true that these efforts have 
made the EU a global leader in information governance best 
practices.82 Moreover, transatlantic approaches to how 
organizations should manage their cyber risk are converging 
around the language of risk management. The EU’s Network 
                                                          
 79. See Lisa M. Segarra, California’s Economy Is Now Bigger Than All of 
the U.K., FORTUNE (May 5, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/05/05/california-fifth 
-biggest-economy-passes-united-kingdom/. 
 80. See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford, Seeking a Safe Harbor in a Widening Sea: 
Unpacking the EJC’s Schrems Decision and What it Means for Transatlantic 
Relations, SETON HALL J. OF DIPLOMACY & INT’L REL. (forthcoming 2018) 
(discussing the differences between EU and US stances on internet governance 
through an analysis of the decision in Schrems v. Data Protection 
Commissioner, ECJ Judgment in Case C-362/14 (2015) (Eur.)). 
 81. Response to EU Cybersecurity Strategy and Proposed Directive on 
Network and Information Security (NIS), DIGITALEUROPE (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://pr.euractiv.com/pr/response-eu-cybersecurity-strategy-and-proposed 
-directive-network-and-information-security-nis (“Member States are building 
communities and trust through local, regional, or sector specific private public 
partnerships, yet we see a general change in approach in the draft Network and 
Information Security Directive from working hand-in-hand with industry, to 
top-down, unidirectional reporting obligations and requirements.”). 
 82. No other nations, for example, have taken the U.S. approach to data 
privacy protection. See Mark Scott & Laurens Cerulus, Europe’s New Data 
Protection Rules Export Privacy Standards Worldwide, POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2018 
12:00 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-data-protection-privacy 
-standards-gdpr-general-protection-data-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/85FR-
NP25] (describing the European Union’s data privacy standards as “de facto 
global standards for most countries except for a few holdouts like China, Russia 
and the United States.”). 
20 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 21:1 
 
Information Security Public-Private Platform (NIS Platform) 
takes a risk management approach, and specifically adopts the 
NIST CSF core—identify, protect, detect, respond, recover—as 
the industry-standard EU approach for cybersecurity policy.83 
As such, this aspect of EU data governance underscores the 
extent to which the transatlantic approach to both cybersecurity 
and privacy is increasingly using both the language and tools of 
risk management introduced above. 
As with cybersecurity and information privacy generally, 
the EU has long been engaged with IoT issues.84 For example, 
the EU founded the Alliance for Internet of Things Innovation.85 
The European Commission has also engaged internationally, 
welcoming delegations from around the world to discuss IoT 
governance,86 reinforcing the EU’s place as a leader for 
cybersecurity and privacy governance. Finally, in late 2015 the 
European Commission launched Horizon 2020, which included 
goals for smart cities and IoT deployment,87 policies that are 
further reinforced by the EU’s push to create a Digital Single 
Market in Europe to support the estimated eleven-trillion-dollar 
                                                          
 83. Compare NIS Platform (WG-1) Final Draft 220515, Network and 
Information Security Risk Management Organisational Structures and 
Requirements, 13–15 (available at https://resilience.enisa.europa.eu 
/nis-platform/shared-documents/5th-plenary-meeting/chapter-1-nis-risk-
management-organisational-structures-and-requirements-v2/at_download/file) 
(considering the “Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover” model its 
discussion of methods “to ensure effective risk management”), with NAT’L INST. 
OF STANDARDS AND TECH supra note 53, at 6–7 (outlining the “Framework Core 
Functions:” identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover). For more on this 
topic, see Shackelford supra note 56. 
 84. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee 
of the Regions, at 2–3, COM (2009) 278 final (June 18, 2009) (explaining that 
adoption of IoT depends on privacy protections, as these protections are a 
prerequisite for social acceptance). 
 85. The Alliance for Internet of Things Innovation (AIOTI), EUROPEAN 
COMM’N (Aug. 2, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/alliance 
-internet-things-innovation-aioti. 
 86. Cf. Meeting with Brazilian Delegation, 28 May, AIOTI NEWS, 
https://aioti.eu/meeting-with-brasilian-delegation-28-may/ (“Brazilian 
delegation presented their IoT strategy and was interested in smart farming 
and health. This exchange will be continued by AIOTI sending note with 
proposals of concrete cooperation areas.”). 
 87. See European Commission Decision on Horizon 2020, O.J. C(2015) 6776 
of 13 October 2015 (identifying five pilot areas including smart living as part of 
a broader movement toward IoT development). 
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economic impact of IoT applications by 2025.88 The latter is only 
one component in the “Digitising European Industry” initiative, 
which includes three pillars for IoT policy across the EU, 
including: “a thriving IoT ecosystem; a human-centered IoT 
approach; [and] a single market for IoT.”89 The proposed 2017 
“European Data Economy” initiative would strengthen the move 
toward a single market for IoT across Europe.90 In short, the EU 
is balancing between an embrace of the IoT and the economic 
opportunities it affords,91 while also taking proactive steps to 
address its downsides, including by clarifying its own liability 
regimes.92 These goals demonstrate how the EU is planning to 
secure the full gamut of IoT devices, including those in the 
manufacturing sector. 
1. Impact of GDPR 
A key aspect for how the EU will shape IoT governance is 
through the GDPR, which is an extension of its long push to 
create a Digital Single Market (DSM) introduced above. 
Although most of the press coverage of the GDPR has focused on 
its privacy protection regulations and the potentially very large 
penalties that can be imposed for not following the data privacy 
rules,93 an important goal of the GDPR is to tear down, to the 
                                                          
 88. See, e.g., The Internet of Things, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https:// 
ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/internet-of-things (last updated Sept. 19, 
2019) (discussing the single digital market); The 2019 State of IoT Report, 
PARTICLE, https://www.particle.io/solutions/2019-state-of-iot-report/ (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2019) (proposing that “IoT will have a total potential economic 
impact of up to $11.1 trillion a year by 2025.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., Research & Innovation in Internet of Things, EUROPEAN 
COMMI’N (Aug. 22, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en 
/research-innovation-iot (identifying five IoT “large scale pilots” covering 
relevant IoT areas). 
 92. See Liability for Emerging Digital Technologies 2 (Commission Staff 
Working Document, Apr. 25, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/european-commission-staff-working-document-liability-
emerging-digital-technologies [https://perma.cc/RAT2-FU8U] (“[A] reflection on 
future needs and developments is needed, not only from the perspective of the 
victim i.e. in order to ensure equitable remedies, compensation and allocation 
of responsibility, but also from the perspective of the innovators and companies 
operating in the EU as legal certainty is a key element for good business 
development.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Scott & Laurens, supra note 82. 
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extent feasible, remaining regulatory walls between the EU 
Member States and move toward a single EU market.94 
Building from this foundation, GDPR is an expansive 
regulatory regime with a wide array of requirements on covered 
firms ranging from ensuring data portability and consent to 
mandating that firms disclose a data breach within seventy-two 
hours of a firm becoming aware of the incident and then 
conducting a post-mortem to ensure that a similar scenario will 
not recur.95 As groundbreaking as these regulations are, though, 
they were not drafted with IoT in mind, despite a 2017 finding 
by the European Union Agency for Network and Information 
Security (ENISA) that there is “no level zero defined for the 
security and privacy of connected and smart devices. . . . 
[or] . . . legal guidelines for trust of IoT devices and services.”96 
Further, European-level regulation is slow, and a blunt 
instrument—GDPR, as one example, took more than four years 
to be adopted after having been proposed in 2012.97 
Microsoft has argued that for manufacturing firms at least, 
“[t]he message is clear: manufacturers, even outside Europe, 
need to consider their exposure under the GDPR and plan 
accordingly.”98 More specifically, according to Olivier Van Hoof 
of the data management firm Collibria: 
                                                          
 94. See Digital Single Market: Bringing Down Barriers to Unlock Online 
Opportunities, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/commission 
/priorities/digital-single-market_en (last visited Aug. 24, 2019) (explaining how 
regulatory barriers must be removed in favor of a single market in order to 
benefit from digital technologies most efficiently). 
 95. See Rita Heimes, Top 10 Operational Impacts of the GDPR: Part 1 – 
Data Security and Breach Notification, INT’L ASSOC. PRIVACY PROF. (Jan. 6, 
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data-security-and-breach-notification/ [https://perma.cc/7E2B-TBDN] 
(discussing how the GDPR raised standards of breach notifications). 
 96. Infineon – NXP – STMicroelectronics-ENISA Common Positon on 
Cybersecurity 1 (Dec. 2016) https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa 
-position-papers-and-opinions/infineon-nxp-st-enisa-position-on-cybersecurity. 
 97. See, e.g., Scott Gordon, Will We Get a GDPR for the IOT?, SC MAGAZINE 
(Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.scmagazineuk.com/will-we-get-a-gdpr-for-the 
-iot/article/758037/ (arguing that the industry should establish standards for 
IoT security because regulation will not be enacted fast enough to address 
rapidly-developing privacy issues). 
 98. Çağlayan Arkan, Achieving GDPR Compliance in Manufacturing, 
MICROSOFT (Dec. 15, 2017), https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/industry 
-blog/industry/manufacturing/achieving-gdpr-compliance-in-manufacturing/ 
[https://perma.cc/W2XR-JKCU]. 
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“[GDPR] has particular relevance for the manufacturing industry, 
which is using AI and RFID [Radio Frequency Identification] to 
collect, use and integrate personal information into product man-
ufacturing. Through IoT and their quest to make better connec-
tions with end users, manufacturers are collecting more infor-
mation about consumers. And we’ve seen a number of studies 
indicating the manufacturing industry lags behind in cybersecu-
rity. Therefore, specific safeguards should be established for these 
newer forms of electronic communications and sharing of personal 
data. And it shouldn’t be taken lightly. Regulators will issue sig-
nificant fines for GDPR non-compliance, up to 2-4% of global reve-
nue for non-compliance. The deadline for compliance . . . [was] 
May 25, 2018.”99 
As such, as with the California laws discussed above, the 
global impact of GDPR on the manufacturing sector should not 
be underestimated, and neither should the NIS Directive. 
2. Applicability of NIS Directive to Smart Factories 
Directives such as NIS have the benefit of providing more 
freedom to nations to craft solutions to common problems, such 
as the need for more robust critical infrastructure protection, but 
this can similarly be a cumbersome process.100 However, these 
directives risk sacrificing consistency across the EU, along with 
the timeliness that is so critical in rapidly-evolving areas such 
as IoT innovation.101 This author has argued that this “type of 
active industry dialogue is a crucial piece of the NIST 
Framework’s success—as well as that of the more general 
bottom-up approach to cybersecurity regulation—in the United 
States, and is one that other nations are seeking to emulate.”102 
However, EU directives are unlike regulations in that they are 
more nation-specific. Some variation is already apparent. For 
                                                          
 99. Craig Guillot, What American Manufacturers Need to Know About New 
Data Protection Laws in Europe, CHIEF EXEC. GRP. (May 31, 2017), 
https://chiefexecutive.net/american-manufacturers-need-know-new-data 
-protection-laws-europe/. 
 100. See Ian Wishart, EU Strikes Cybersecurity Deal to Make Companies 
Boost Defenses, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/articles/2015-12-08/eu-strikes-cybersecurity-deal-to-make-companies-boost-
defenses. (describing new EU rules that apply to all “critical operators” in 
“energy, transport, health and banking.”). 
 101. See generally Applying EU Law, Eur. Comm’n https://ec.europa.eu/info 
/law/law-making-process/applying-eu-law_en [https://perma.cc/98ES-XJQE] 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2019) (providing additional information on the distinction 
between directives and regulations in the EU context). 
 102. Shackelford, Russell, & Haut, supra note 56, at 222–23. 
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example, the French government is considering mandating 
liability for security lapses on the part of IoT manufacturers.103 
This is similar to the different approaches being taken by U.S. 
states when it comes to IoT security. 
C. APPLICABILITY OF BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY TO MANAGING 
SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS 
It is well-known that hackers can exploit vulnerabilities in 
software such as by sending users virus-infected emails or 
compromised links.104 It is less well-known that attackers can 
also meddle with computers by altering the hardware on which 
the software runs.105 These weaknesses are physical, and one 
might think they are therefore easier to identify than spotting a 
bug in millions of lines of code. In fact, they can be just as 
difficult to locate, if not more so.106 As aforementioned, the 
supply chains for many firms are complex and frequently span 
dozens of jurisdictions and potentially hundreds of suppliers. 
Apple’s iPhone, for example, relies on hundreds of suppliers from 
around the world.107 Each of these steps in the manufacturing 
process introduces opportunities for security problems to arise. 
Recent research suggests that hackers could use smartphone 
apps to damage manufacturing equipment, or even destroy 
entire factories.108 While no such large-scale disaster has yet 
taken place, even sophisticated retailers like Amazon have been 
                                                          
 103. See Gordon, supra note 97. 
 104. See, e.g., Arun Vishwanath, ‘Spearphishing’ Roiled the Presidential 
Campaign – Here’s How to Protect Yourself, CONVERSATION (Nov. 8, 2016), 
https://theconversation.com/spearphishing-roiled-the-presidential-campaign 
-heres-how-to-protect-yourself-68274. 
 105. See Andy Greenberg, This ‘Demonically Clever’ Backdoor Hides in a 
Tiny Slice of a Computer Chip, WIRED (June 1, 2016), https://www.wired.com 
/2016/06/demonically-clever-backdoor-hides-inside-computer-chip/. 
 106. Kaiyuan Yang et al., A2: Analog Malicious Hardware. IEEE, 23–25 
May 2016 at 18. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber 
=7546493. 
 107. See, e.g., Ian Baker, The Global Supply Chain Behind the iPhone 6, 
BETANEWS (2014), https://betanews.com/2014/09/23/the-global-supply-chain 
-behind-the-iphone-6/. 
 108. See Martin Giles, Hackers Could Blow Up Factories Using Smartphone 
Apps, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com 
/s/609946/hackers-could-blow-up-factories-using-smartphone-apps/ (describing 
vulnerabilities in the control systems of some automated factories). 
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fooled by counterfeit facsimiles of real products.109 Some supply 
chain threats are more malicious. In 2012, Microsoft warned 
customers that malware was being loaded onto computers made 
in China “after they were shipped to a distributor.”110 Even 
innocent motives may underlie serious problems. In 2015, 
Lenovo installed advertising software on its computers, which 
had the effect of dangerously weakening system security.111 It is 
also distinctly possible that government actors could 
compromise the supply chain for the purposes of espionage.112 
These issues are particularly problematic in the IIoT context as 
more technology is deployed in factories, expanding economic 
opportunities as well as the attack surface that manufacturers 
must defend. 
One new way to help secure such complex supply chains 
involves blockchain technology. The blockchain is a 
decentralized database that can be stored and maintained across 
                                                          
 109. See Ari Levy, Amazon’s Chinese Counterfeit Problem Is Getting Worse, 
CNBC (July 8, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/08/amazons-chinese-
counterfeit-problem-is-getting-worse.html (explaining that Amazon is not able 
to combat the influx of Chinese counterfeit products. If Amazon is not able to 
spot counterfeits, an industrial producer could be similarly fooled).  
 110. See Malware Being Installed on Computers in Supply Chain, Warns 
Microsoft, GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/technology 
/2012/sep/14/malware-installed-computers-factories-microsoft (describing an 
incident in which malware was loaded onto hardware while still in the 
distributor’s supply chain). 
 111. See Elizabeth Weise, FTC Settles with Lenovo Over a Built-In Snooping 
Software, $3.5 Million Fine, USA TODAY (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.usatoday 
.com/story/tech/2017/09/05/ftc-settles-lenovo-over-built-snooping 
-software-scanned-users-computers/632775001/ [https://perma.cc/FD24-UD9K 
] (Lenovo settled with the FTC regarding claims its laptops included 
preinstalled software that could potentially be exploited to obtain users’ 
sensitive personal information); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The ‘Internet of Things’ 
Is Sending Us Back to the Middle Ages, CONVERSATION (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://theconversation.com/the-internet-of-things-is-sending-us-back-to-the 
-middle-ages-81435 (Lenovo’s software “hijacked web browsers’ traffic without 
the user’s knowledge – including web communications users thought were 
securely encrypted, like connections to banks and online stores for financial 
transactions.”). 
 112. See, e.g., T.C. Sottek, NSA Reportedly Intercepting Laptops Purchased 
Online to Install Spy Malware, VERGE (Dec. 29, 2013), https: 
//www.theverge.com/2013/12/29/5253226/nsa-cia-fbi-laptop-usb-plant-spy 
(claiming the NSA is able to intercept computers and use advanced hacking 
tools to plant spy software without the owner’s permission or knowledge). 
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myriad systems.113 Blockchain technology, for example, could be 
used to track and verify the inputs into complicated supply 
chains like Apple’s.114 Futurist Bernard Marr has argued that, 
“[u]ltimately, blockchain can increase the efficiency and 
transparency of supply chains and positively impact everything 
from warehousing to delivery to payment. Chain of command is 
essential for many things, and blockchain has the chain of 
command built in.”115 The Australian car manufacturer Tomcar, 
for example, pays its suppliers using Bitcoin.116 Major 
multinational firms such as Unilever, Nestle, Tyson, Dole, and 
Walmart already use blockchain applications to keep track of 
food sources.117 However, no blockchain is immune to hacking.118 
Policymakers around the world are taking a hard look at 
appropriate blockchain regulations, with divergent approaches 
being tried from Albany to Brussels.119 
II. ROLE FOR POLICYMAKERS 
Policymakers at the state and federal level can help 
manufacturing firms better manage the multifaceted cyber 
threat facing smart factories. This part discusses some available 
reform options, beginning with civil society and insurance before 
moving on to standards bodies and finally to an analysis of 
pending bills before Congress and the importance of fostering 
international dialogue. 
                                                          
 113. See, e.g., Bernard Marr, How Blockchain Will Transform the Supply 
Chain and Logistics Industry, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2018, 12:28 AM), 
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 116. Marr, supra note 113. 
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Techno-Futurists Can Ruin Things, RECODE (June 19, 2016), https:// 
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Organization, a democratically controlled investment group operated on the 
blockchain, was hacked by exploiting vulnerabilities in its code). 
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YALE J. L. & TECH. 334, 366–69 (2017) (explaining differences in blockchain 
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A. INSTILLING CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT BEST 
PRACTICES: A ROLE FOR INSURANCE? 
Instead of top-down regulation, many, particularly in 
industry, prefer self-regulation with the flexibility “to adapt to 
rapid technological progress.”120 Such self-regulation has the 
capacity to adapt better and faster than black letter law to 
rapidly changing technological and social forces,121 though it is 
certainly not without its problems.122 Consumer Reports is an 
example of an organization that is trying to create such a 
community. In March 2017, Consumer Reports launched its 
Digital Standard, which is designed “to measure the privacy and 
security of products, apps, and services.”123 Once it fully 
matures, the Digital Standard could help empower consumers to 
select products—including in the IoT context—that meet 
rigorous privacy and security requirements. Of course, 
Consumer Reports is not a regulatory organization, vendors will 
still be legally able to sell products that do not meet the Digital 
Standard. However, the Digital Standard might help the market 
function more efficiently by rewarding those firms that take 
cybersecurity and data privacy seriously and penalizing those 
that do not through lower scores and, as a result, less revenue. 
These efforts are already having an impact, the Digital Standard 
was instrumental in exposing privacy risks in the fertility app 
Glow.124 As the Digital Standard is continually refined and 
                                                          
 120. MONROE E. PRICE & STEFAAN G. VERHULST, SELF-REGULATION AND 
THE INTERNET 21 (2005). 
 121. See id. at 21–22 (“[S]elf-regulation offers the benefits of greater 
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 122. See generally Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems as One Approach for 
Solving Collective-Action Problems 2–3 (Ind. Univ. Workshop in Political 
Theory and Policy Analysis, Working Paper Series No. 08-6, 2008), 
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/4417/W08 
-6_Ostrom_DLC.pdf (describing the advantages and disadvantages of 
polycentric governance). 
 123. Consumer Reports Launches Digital Standard to Safeguard 
Consumers’ Security and Privacy in Complex Marketplace, CONSUMER REP. 
(Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/media-room/press-releases 
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Threats, Consumer Reports Finds, CONSUMER REP. (July 28, 2016), 
https://www.consumerreports.org/mobile-security-software/glow-pregnancy 
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globalized, as is happening now in dialogue with the EU, it will 
likely further impact the trajectory and rate of global IoT privacy 
and security standards, including those available to 
manufacturers.125 
The insurance industry is similarly helping to incentivize 
the uptake of cybersecurity best practices. Chris Palmer, a 
former Technology Director of the Electronic Frontiers 
Foundation has called it a “key part of the [cybersecurity] 
solution.”126 Although estimates vary,127 this market could be 
worth more than $7.5 billion by 2020,128 and $23.07 billion by 
2025.129 Regulatory developments, such as the Securities and 
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in 2010 “companies will take out around $600 million in premiums for cyber 
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 128. See Jim Finkle, Cyber Insurance Premiums Rocket After High-Profile 
Attacks, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2015, 12:33 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article 
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five years . . . .”); accord PWC, INSURANCE 2020 & BEYOND: REAPING THE 
DIVIDENDS OF CYBER RESILIENCE 10 (2015), 
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/insurance/publications/assets/reaping-dividends 
-cyber-resilience.pdf (“We estimate that the cyber insurance market could grow 
to . . . at least $7.5 billion by 2020.”). 
 129. See Global Cyber Security Insurance Market Size Forecast to Exceed 
USD 20 Billion by 2025, ADROIT MARKET RESEARCH, (Apr. 6, 2019), 
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Exchange Commission (SEC) cyber attack disclosure guidelines, 
could reinforce this trend.130 Yet calculating cyber risk insurance 
premiums is no simple feat given the paucity of reliable data.131 
Even defining covered “cyber attacks” and cybersecurity best 
practices can be difficult, though an insurance company might 
use the NIST CSF and FTC guidelines discussed above as 
helpful data points.132 Overall, the insurance industry could aid 
in the process of boosting cybersecurity due diligence across the 
economy, including in the manufacturing sector. Over time, such 
efforts may improve the overall level of cybersecurity 
preparedness of manufacturing firms, though it is important to 
understand that such coverage is only part of the solution, and 
that it is vital to review coverage terms lest patchy policies 
contribute to an inaccurate and reactive mindset on the part of 
covered firms.133 
B. FEDERAL POLICY OPTIONS 
An array of policy options are being discussed at the federal 
level that would impact the growth and development of IIoT 
applications. This section focuses on the most recent of these 
efforts, including establishing baseline cybersecurity standards 
through an IoT security bill, protecting consumer privacy 
through a repackaged Privacy Bill of Rights, as well as 
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encouraging proactive cybersecurity measures through allowing 
limited active defense. 
1. Codifying Cybersecurity Baselines: Proposed IoT Security 
Bill 
Senators Mark Warner, Cory Gardner, Ron Wyden, and 
Steve Daines introduced the IoT Cybersecurity Act of 2017 with 
this aim in mind.134 In brief, the legislation would require 
vendors who sell products to the U.S. government to: (1) ensure 
that their devices “are patchable,” (2) that they do not “contain 
known vulnerabilities,” (3) that they “rely on standard 
protocols,” and (4) they “don’t contain hard-coded passwords.”135 
However, the bill does not take a one-size-fits-all approach to 
regulating an area as vast as IoT. Indeed, the authors provide a 
path forward whereby, if industry provides “equivalent, or more 
rigorous, device security requirements” then they may be 
utilized in lieu of the foregoing.136 The legislative effort has a 
long list of proponents from Bruce Schneier and Professor 
Jonathan Zittrain to leading voices from Symantec and the 
Center for Democracy and Technology,137 but also has its share 
of critics.138 This bill has still not become law as of 2019, so 
perhaps other alternatives should be considered.139 These 
alternatives include the Internet of Things Cybersecurity 
                                                          
 134. See generally S. 1691, 115th Cong. pmbl., § 1 (2017) (providing for 
“minimal cybersecurity operational standards for [i]nternet-connected devices 
purchased by Federal agencies, and for other purposes.”). In 2019 a modified 
version of the bill was reintroduced by the same sponsors. Internet of Things 
(IoT) Cybersecurity Act, S. 734, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 135. MARK WARNER ET AL., INTERNET OF THINGS CYBERSECURITY 
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2017 FACT SHEET 1 (2017), https:// 
www.warner.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/8/6/861d66b8-93bf-4c93-84d0-
6bea67235047/8061BCEEBF4300EC702B4E894247D0E0.iot-cybesecurity-
improvement-act---fact-sheet.pdf. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. at 2. 
 138. See Brian Krebs, New Bill Seeks Basic IoT Security Standards, KREBS 
ON SEC. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/08/new-bill-seeks 
-basic-iot-security-standards/ [https://perma.cc/C238-TE8N] (criticizing the bill 
for “exempt[ing] cybersecurity researchers engaging in good-faith research from 
liability under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act when in engaged in research pursuant to adopted coordinated 
vulnerability disclosure guidelines.”). 
 139. See S. 1691: Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 
2017 Track S. 1691, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115 
/s1691 (last visited Dec. 20, 2019). 
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Improvement Act of 2019, which calls upon NIST and the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) to “leverage Federal 
Government procurement power to encourage increased 
cybersecurity for Internet of Things devices.”140 
2. Protecting Consumer Privacy: Privacy Bill of Rights 
There are proposals at the federal level, similar to 
California’s 2018 Consumer Privacy Act. These proposals seek 
to codify some of the protections similar to the protections in the 
GDPR, discussed above. This Privacy Bill of Rights, a version of 
which was first trumpeted by the Obama Administration in 
2012, was part of the CONSENT (Consumer Online Notification 
for Stopping Edge-provider Network Transgressions) Act 
introduced by Senate Democrats in 2018 in the wake of the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal.141 If enacted, the law would 
require covered firms “to obtain opt-in consent from users before 
sharing, selling or otherwise using their personal 
information . . . [along with] develop[ing] reasonable data 
security practices.”142 It would impact manufacturers directly 
since its cybersecurity and data processing requirements would 
apply not just to social networks, but to an array of publicly 
traded firms including those deploying IIoT tech.143 
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3. Fostering Proactive Cybersecurity: Active Defense Bill 
In 2018, Congress considered a wide range of cybersecurity 
legislation from a privacy bill of rights144 to election security.145 
Relevant to this discussion, they also considered a version of the 
Active Cyber Defense Certainty (ACDC) Act.146 The ACDC Act147 
would permit firms to operate beyond their network perimeter, 
including the potential to conduct surveillance on entities “who 
are thought to have done hacking in the past or who, according 
to a tip or some other intelligence, are planning an attack.”148 
The bill also clarifies “the type of tools and techniques that 
defenders can use that exceed the boundaries of their own 
computer network.”149 In summary, according to Congressman 
Graves, “[t]his is an effort to give the private sector the tools they 
need to defend themselves.”150 If enacted, such a policy would 
allow manufacturers to potentially target foreign sponsors of 
cyber attacks.151 
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Concerns regarding the ACDC act, though, fall across 
several dimensions. Some, such as former National Security 
Agency Directors Admiral Michael S. Rogers and Keith 
Alexander, are concerned about further complicating an already 
complex cyber threat landscape.152 Others, such as Rob Joyce, 
President Trump’s cybersecurity adviser, are more concerned 
about sanctioning “vigilantism” which could, he argued, even in 
a best-case scenario, lead to “unqualified actors bringing risk to 
themselves, their targets, and their governments.”153 A new 
version of the Act was introduced in 2019.154 
In general, there is a growing consensus that firms should 
practice passive defense best practices,155 and not “hacking back” 
to recover assets due to serious concerns regarding attribution 
and escalation.156 
C. GOVERNING SMART FACTORIES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
NORMS DEVELOPMENT 
There are many ways to conceptualize cybersecurity policy 
in the IIoT context, but among them is the dynamic field of 
polycentric governance.157 As this author has described it 
previously, this governance framework may be considered to be 
a multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-functional, and multi-
sectoral model,158 championed by numerous scholars including 
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Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom and Professor Vincent Ostrom.159 
It “challenges orthodoxy [in part] by demonstrating the benefits 
of self-organization and networking regulations ‘at multiple 
scales.’”160 Rather than attempting a unitary response to 
managing “global collective action problems,”161 such as cyber-
attacks, a polycentric approach “recognizes that diverse 
organizations working at multiple levels can create different 
types of policies that can increase levels of cooperation and 
compliance, enhancing ‘flexibility across issues and adaptability 
over time.’”162 This, in other words, envisions an all-of-the-above 
approach that harnesses positive network effects that could, in 
time, result in the emergence of a “norm cascade” improving 
smart factory security.163 Moreover, the various analytical tools 
developed to help measure and implement the findings from the 
polycentric governance literature, including the Ostrom Design 
Principles and the Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) Framework,164 may help create an analytical guide for 
smart factories to identify governance gaps.165 
One example of a successful public-private polycentric 
collaboration is the NIST CSF, which, as has been noted, is now 
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going global.166 The success of such frameworks, civil society 
efforts like the Consumer Reports Digital Standard,167 and 
regional regimes like the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation,168 is part and parcel of the literature on polycentric 
governance given the extent to which it leverages self-
organization while also recognizing the need for a coordinating 
function between disparate groups and governance scales.169 
However, it is important to note that not all polycentric systems 
are guaranteed to be successful. Disadvantages, for example, can 
include gridlock and a lack of defined hierarchy.170 The Ostrom 
Design Principles referenced above can help predict the 
institutional success of given interventions.171 Still, the 
literature remains immature, as does the current state of IoT 
governance. In fact, the ISACA, previously known as the 
Information Systems Audit and Control Association,172 surveyed 
IT professionals in the United Kingdom and found that “75 
percent of the security experts polled say they do not believe 
device manufacturers are implementing sufficient security 
measures in IoT devices, and a further 73 percent say existing 
security standards in the industry do not sufficiently address IoT 
specific security concerns.”173 
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Manufacturing firms should engage in these conversations. 
Manufacturing firms have already made considerable progress 
in making attacks on civilian critical infrastructure, including 
smart factories, off limits. They have also made considerable 
investments in both security and privacy by design, but they can 
go farther by refining the scope. This involves further refining 
the scope of cybersecurity due diligence at the international 
level, as well as boosting public-private information sharing, and 
even recasting the cybersecurity debate in the manufacturing 
sector as not just an exercise in cost-benefit analysis, but as a 
corporate social responsibility. Firms could build from this 
conception by participating in communities to help spread this 
approach, such as through the Cybersecurity Tech Accord,174 
and the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace.175 
CONCLUSION 
As the IoT matures, and more things and organizations are 
connected, there is a potential to build smart (and potentially 
more resilient) things, factories, and societies. Smart factories 
and their impacts span myriad sectors and industries. In 
response, polycentric IoT governance systems should be 
leveraged to improve critical infrastructure security and protect 
consumer privacy.176 This includes frameworks and standards—
including an NIST IoT-specific effort—along with the Consumer 
Reports Digital Standard, and the use of corporate governance 
structures, such as sustainability, and international norms, 
including due diligence. Such an “all-of-the-above” polycentric 
approach is essential to addressing governance gaps in smart 
factories as part of improving security and data privacy in the 
ever-expanding Internet of Everything. 
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